

## Message Text

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SUBJECT:

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NATO CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL FROM WASHINGTON

SUBJECT: POLITICAL ANALYSIS: SOVIET-ROMANIAN RELATIONS  
IN THE WAKE OF BREZHNEV'S VISIT

1. BOTH THE SOVIETS AND THE ROMANIANS COULD PLAUSIBLY  
CLAIM TO HAVE ACHIEVED THEIR MINIMUM OBJECTIVES DURING  
BREZHNEV'S RECENT VISIT TO BUCHAREST. AT THE SAME TIME  
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BOTH SIDES REAFFIRMED FUNDAMENTALLY CONFLICTING CONCEPTIONS

OF HOW RELATIONS AMONG COMMUNIST COUNTRIES AND PARTIES, BOTH WITHIN AND OUTSIDE THE WARSAW PACT, SHOULD BE CONDUCTED.

2. SOME SOVIET OBJECTIVES MET

3. FROM BREZHNEV'S STANDPOINT, THE POSITIVE RESULTS OF HIS NOVEMBER 22-24 VISIT TO ROMANIA, THE FIRST BY A SOVIET PARTY LEADER SINCE ROMANIA EMBARKED ON ITS INDEPENDENT COURSE IN THE MID-1960'S, INCLUDED:

(A)--THE MOST EXPLICIT COMMITMENT YET GIVEN BY THE ROMANIANS TO EXPAND PARTY-TO-PARTY CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIETS;

(B)--A ROMANIAN PLEDGE TO EXPAND CONSULTATIONS ON BILATERAL STATE RELATIONS AND ON INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS "WITH THE AIM OF REACHING AGREED POSITIONS"; AND

(C)--ROMANIAN ACCEPTANCE OF TWO NEW WARSAW PACT BODIES--THE FOREIGN MINISTERS COMMITTEE AND THE JOINT SECRETARIAT.

3. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SOVIETS ARE PROBABLY NOT CONVINCED THAT THESE GESTURES IMPLY ANY CHANGE IN CEAUSESCU'S HOSTILITY TOWARD SOVIET INFLUENCE WITHIN THE RANKS OF THE ROMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (RCP). NOR ARE THEY LIKELY TO BE UNDER ANY ILLUSION THAT THE ROMANIANS WILL ABANDON THEIR FREE-WHEELING FOREIGN POLICY OR DISCONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS TO BLOCK ANY DEVELOPMENTS THAT WOULD ALLOW SUPRANATIONAL INSTITUTIONS WITHIN THE PACT TO ASSUME REAL DECISIONMAKING AUTHORITY. HOWEVER, BREZHNEV CAN POINT TO ANY EVIDENCE OF MOVEMENT IN THESE AREAS AS PROOF THAT HIS VISIT HELPED TO PROMOTE SOVIET OBJECTIVES.

4. ROMANIANS ALSO SCORE POINTS

5. CEAUSESCU, WHILE NOT OBTAINING ANY SIGNIFICANT SOVIET QUID PRO QUO FOR HIS FORTHCOMING POSITIONS ON THESE MATTERS, WAS ABLE WITH HIS CUSTOMARY ADROITNESS TO USE BREZHNEV'S VISIT TO FURTHER ROMANIA'S INTERNATIONAL IMAGE AS AN INDEPENDENT COMMUNIST COUNTRY THAT DOES NOT COMPROMISE

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MISE ITS BASIC FOREIGN POLICY PRINCIPLES. (ROMANIAN OFFICIALS PRIVATELY TOOK THE LINE THAT BREZHNEV'S VISIT EVEN REPRESENTED A TACIT, IF GRUDGING, SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF ROMANIA'S RIGHT TO CONDUCT ITS OWN FOREIGN POLICY.)

6. FOR EXAMPLE, THE EXTENSIVE ROMANIAN MEDIA COVERAGE OF SECRETARY OF COMMERCE RICHARDSON'S CALL ON CEAUSESCU THE DAY OF BREZHNEV'S ARRIVAL, AND THE LESS CONSPICUOUS BUT

EQUALLY POINTED PUBLICATION OF THE NEWS OF THE SIMULTANEOUS PRESENCE IN CHINA OF A ROMANIAN DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER, WAS DESIGNED TO PUT THE SOVIETS ON NOTICE THAT ROMANIA DID NOT INTEND TO DOWNPLAY ITS TIES WITH THE USSR'S PRINCIPAL ADVERSARIES IN ORDER TO ACCOMMODATE MOSCOW. IN MORE MUTED, BUT EQUALLY UNMISTAKABLE FASHION, CEAUSESCU USED THE OCCASIONS OF HIS DINNER TOAST TO BREZHNEV AND HIS "FRIENDSHIP RALLY" SPEECH TO REAFFIRM THE FAMILIAR ROMANIAN PRINCIPLES OF EACH STATE'S AND EACH COMMUNIST PARTY'S FULL EQUALITY AND RIGHT TO COMPLETE FREEDOM FROM FOREIGN INTERFERENCE.

7. INDEED, CEAUSESCU'S AND BREZHNEV'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS DURING THE VISIT FREQUENTLY TOOK ON THE TONES OF A DEBATE. CEAUSESCU REFERRED TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONFERENCE (ECPC) TO STRESS THE "NEW UNITY" BASED ON "EQUALITY AND RESPECT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF EACH PARTY"; BREZHNEV CONSTANTLY HARPED ON THE NEED FOR "THE COHESION OF THE COUNTRIES OF SOCIALISM ON THE PRINCIPLES OF MARXISM-LENINISM AND PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM." TO KEEP THESE DIFFERENCES FROM UNDERMINING THE APPEARANCE OF A RELATIVELY HARMONIOUS SUMMIT, THE TWO LEADERS CHARACTERIZED THEM AS BEING "ON NON-ESSENTIAL QUESTIONS" (CEAUSESCU) OR AS NOT "MAJOR" (BREZHNEV).

#### 8. A COMPROMISE DOCUMENT

9. TAKEN AS A WHOLE, THE "STATEMENT ON FURTHER DEVELOPING COOPERATION AND FRATERNAL FRIENDSHIP," SIGNED BY CEAUSESCU AND BREZHNEV AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE VISIT, IS CLEARLY A COMPROMISE DOCUMENT CONTAINING NO MAJOR INNOVATIONS. IT CONTRASTS NOTABLY WITH OTHER RECENT SOVIET-EAST EUROPEAN BILATERAL DOCUMENTS, SUCH AS THE GIEREK-BREZHNEV

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COMMUNIQUE ISSUED LESS THAN TWO WEEKS BEFORE, WHICH EMPHASIZED THE "COHESION" OF THE SOCIALIST "FAMILY" AND THE NEED TO DEFEND "SOCIALIST ACHIEVEMENTS." THE STATEMENT'S MORE SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS INCLUDE:

(A)--ITS FAILURE TO CHARACTERIZE THE TWO LEADERS' VIEWS AS MARKED BY "GROWING UNANIMITY" (AS WAS DONE FOLLOWING THEIR AUGUST MEETING IN THE CRIMEA) OR EVEN BY "SIMILARITY";

(B)--THE ABSENCE OF ANY REFERENCE TO MILITARY COOPERATION OR TO THE WARSAW PACT ALLIANCE--EXCEPT FOR NOTING THAT IT WAS "WARSAW PACT MEMBER STATES" THAT FIRST PROPOSED THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE;

(C)--EMPHASIS ON THE EXPANSION OF TIES BETWEEN THE RCP AND THE CPSU, INCLUDING INCREASED COOPERATION IN THE IDEOLOGICAL FIELD AND MORE FREQUENT VISITS BY PARTY OFFICIALS AT ALL LEVELS; AND

(D)--ROMANIAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE PHRASE "PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM" (AVOIDED BY CEAUSESCU IN HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS DURING THE VISIT), BUT ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF BILATERAL PARTY RELATIONS. IN PASSAGES DEALING WITH RELATIONS WITH OTHER COMMUNIST PARTIES THE MORE INNOCUOUS ECPC-ENDORSED PHRASE "INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY" WAS SUBSTITUTED.

10. ON THE SENSITIVE ISSUE OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS, THE STATEMENT MERELY NOTED THAT "THE CORRESPONDING ORGANS OF BOTH COUNTRIES WILL INSURE THE FULFILLMENT AND STRIVE FOR THE OVERFULFILLMENT OF THE FIVE-YEAR TRADE AGREEMENT FOR 1976-1980" AND WILL BEGIN DRAFTING A LONG-TERM COOPERATION AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD AFTER 1980. THERE HAVE BEEN SUBSEQUENT INDICATIONS THAT THE ALREADY POSTPONED MEETING OF THE SOVIET-ROMANIAN JOINT ECONOMIC COMMISSION WOULD NOT TAKE PLACE THIS YEAR AND THAT THE SOVIETS, CONTRARY TO SOME EARLIER REPORTS, HAD NOT AGREED TO PROVIDE ROMANIA WITH CRUDE OIL. IT THUS APPEARS THAT ANY HOPES THE ROMANIANS MAY HAVE ENTERTAINED OF GREATER SOVIET GENEROSITY ON OIL AND OTHER RAW MATERIAL SUPPLIES WERE, CONFIDENTIAL

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AT LEAST FOR THE PRESENT, DASHED BY BREZHNEV.

11. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

12. WITH THE OUTCOME OF THE BREZHNEV VISIT TOLERABLE, IF FAR FROM IDEAL FOR EACH SIDE, IT IS LIKELY THAT BREZHNEV AND CEAUSESCU WILL CONTINUE IN COMING MONTHS TO EXPLOIT THE CURRENT LIMITED THAW IN THEIR COUNTRIES' RELATIONS IN PURSUING THEIR RESPECTIVE POLICY AIMS. WHERE THESE AIMS HAPPEN TO COINCIDE, AS IN BOTH SIDES' SHARED SUSPICION OF WESTERN EFFORTS TO PROMOTE MORE RAPID IMPLEMENTATION OF CSCE BASKET III PROVISIONS, THEY MAY SEE IT IN THEIR INTEREST TO "COORDINATE" MORE FREQUENTLY.

13. THERE IS NO SIGN, HOWEVER, THAT EITHER SIDE IS PREPARED TO MODIFY ITS BASIC STAND ON THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE OF MOSCOW'S CLAIM TO HEGEMONY WITHIN THE FRAGMENTED WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. CEAUSESCU'S UNWILLINGNESS TO BUDGE IN THIS AREA MAY EXPLAIN HIS APPARENT LACK OF SUCCESS ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT DURING BREZHNEV'S VISIT. DESPITE THIS DISAPPOINTMENT, CEAUSESCU WILL PROBABLY SEEK TO CONTINUE THE CLIMATE OF EASED TENSION WITH MOSCOW,

THEREBY KEEPING A MAXIMUM OF FLEXIBILITY AT A TIME OF  
TRANSITION BOTH IN CHINA AND IN THE UNITED STATES.

14. SIMILARLY, BREZHNEV WILL PROBABLY SEEK TO AVOID SUB-  
STANTIALLY INCREASING PRESSURE ON ROMANIA, AT LEAST UNTIL  
HE HAS EXPLORED WASHINGTON'S OUTLOOK UNDER THE NEW US

ADMINISTRATION AND FURTHER TESTED THE POSSIBILITY OF  
RAPPROCHEMENT WITH CHINA'S POST-MAO LEADERSHIP.

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